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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ntour.ntou.edu.tw:8080/ir/handle/987654321/45036

Title: Optimal Effort and Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Human Captial Accumulation and Cross-Shareholding
Authors: 李堯賢;莊慶達
Contributors: 國立臺灣海洋大學:海洋事務與資源管理研究所
Keywords: Humancapitalaccumulation;Cross-0Shareholding;Incentive Contract;Differental Game
Date: 1994-07
Issue Date: 2017-12-26T08:42:32Z
Publisher: Journal of Management & Systems
Abstract: Abstract:This paper analyzes the impacts of cross-shareholding and human capital
accumulation on the agent's cost-reducing effort activities and the principal's
cost-sharing ratio. Using a differential game model in which the agent has
the long-term supplier relationships with his principal. We show that the
trade-off relationship between risk-sharing and moral hazard does not
necessarily hold in the dynamic framework. Moreover, we find that
when human capital accumulation and cross-shareholding are modeled,
both the principal's optimal cost-sharing ratio and the agent's optimal
cost-reducing effort level will be higher.
Relation: 1(2) pp.193-214
URI: http://ntour.ntou.edu.tw:8080/ir/handle/987654321/45036
Appears in Collections:[海洋事務與資源管理研究所] 期刊論文

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