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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ntour.ntou.edu.tw:8080/ir/handle/987654321/44158

Title: 利用賽局理論分析臺灣遠洋圍網漁業與太平洋島國漁業合作策略
Strategy Analysis of Fisheries Cooperation between Taiwan Distant Water Tuna Purse Seine Fishery and Pacific Island Countries by Game Theory
Authors: Liao, Chun-Pei
廖君珮
Contributors: NTOU:Institute of Marine Affairs and Resource Managemen
國立臺灣海洋大學:海洋事務與資源管理研究所
Keywords: 漁業管理;漁業合作;賽局理論;中西太平洋圍網漁業
fishery management;fishery cooperation;game theory;WCPFC purse seine tuna fishery
Date: 2013
Issue Date: 2017-11-15T08:40:49Z
Abstract: 中西太平洋擁有全球最豐富的鮪魚資源,亦為全球美式鰹鮪圍網漁業最主要的作業漁場。中西太平洋圍網漁業中,遠洋國與太平洋島國的漁業合作透過國與國間的多邊協定或雙邊協定,並遵守各機制與安排所訂定之作業規範,包含諾魯協定(Nauru Agreement)、帛琉安排(Palau Arrangement)及2007年起實施的漁船作業天數方案(Vessel Day Scheme, VDS)等,區域性漁業管理組織之演變最早可由1947年南太平洋委員會(South Pacific Committee, SPC)談起,爾後1979年成立論的壇漁業局(Forum Fisheries Agency, FFA)及2004年以中西太平洋魚類資源達永續利用為目的而成立的中西太平洋漁業委員會(Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, WCPFC)等。本文以中西太平洋鰹鮪圍網漁業為研究對象,首先討論臺灣與巴布亞紐幾內亞、密克羅尼西亞、吉里巴斯、馬紹爾群島、諾魯、索羅門群島及吐瓦魯等國之合作關係,基於文獻回顧設計問卷,藉由對相關專家的深度訪談蒐集資料,並進行賽局理論機制設計。本研究賽局分為「臺灣圍網業者與島國總體賽局」與「臺灣圍網業者與個別島國賽局」兩類,並分別假定賽局情境於2009年至2012年之低魚價及高魚價,分析臺灣與個別島國於圍網漁業合作之關係。個別島國之挑選乃以臺灣圍網歷史漁撈天數中,挑選出作業天數比例最高之巴布亞紐幾內亞、居中之吉里巴斯及作業天數最少之馬紹爾三國做為參賽者。在區域性漁業管理組織限定漁撈能力等保育措施實施下,作業條件日漸嚴苛,漁船油價高漲及作業天數方案的實施等亦造成圍網船作業成本大幅增加。「臺灣業者與島國總體賽局」顯示島國優勢策略(dominant strategy)為未來將續實施作業天數方案,臺灣則以與島國聯合經營漁船為優勢策略。「臺灣圍網業者與個別島國賽局」顯示,在高魚價趨勢下,臺灣對於主要作業漁場之巴布亞紐幾內亞與吉里巴斯,除確保漁捕效率外,應採取以降低入漁費為主之經營策略。巴布亞紐幾內亞、吉里巴斯與馬紹爾對臺灣圍網業者之賽局結果均顯示島國政府之優勢策略乃持續實施作業天數方案以獲得最大經濟效益,臺灣業者優勢策略則為與島國聯合經營漁船。臺灣圍網業者於巴布亞紐幾內亞作業天數最多,在高魚價情境下,可維持良好經營。與吉里巴斯賽局顯示,在以高魚價情境下可維持經營,惟在魚價不理想的情境下,臺灣業者的優勢策略為聯合經營漁船以降低入漁成本;而與馬紹爾賽局結果顯示,臺灣優勢策略為與島國聯合經營漁船,在低魚價的情境下臺灣業者可能會出現虧損,而馬紹爾施政以降低失業率為最優先考量,更突顯臺灣業者與馬紹爾在漁業合作上聯合經營船隊的優勢。中西太平洋鰹鮪圍網漁業管理規範複雜,臺灣在遵守各保育措施下經營圍網漁業外,思考新漁業合作型態及就糧食安全、協助島國經濟發展、實踐遠洋國責任的角度思考,建立公海與國際漁業合作典範。
To be confronted with population growth, fishery resources have been a major source of protein for human. In virtue of some reasons, like nutritive value, tuna species are popular among others. The tuna industry in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is one of the largest and most valuable fisheries in the world and many countries developed their tuna fisheries there. The tuna fishery in WCPO is complicated with Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), agreements, treaty and scheme. The South Pacific Committee (SPC) established in 1947 as the oldest RFMOs, Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) in 1979 and Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) in 2004. The fishery cooperations between Pacific island countries (PICs) and distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) by multilateral agreements or bilateral agreements, and manage under the scheme, conservation and management measure (CMMs), which include Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) implemented in 2007. This research aims to study of Taiwan purse seine fishery cooperation with PICs in WCPO and analysis by Game Theory, which include Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. In order to set the game of WCPO tuna purse seine fisheries by the mechanism design, collected the informations by literature analysis method and case study, then use the semi-standardized in-depth interview with the experts. There are totaol 7 games were setted, include two categories and two scenarios. The categories are “The Taiwan Purse Seiner to PICs Game ” and “The Taiwan Purse Seiner to individual PIC Game”, under two scenarios as the high price and low price of fish by 2009-2012. “The Taiwan Purse Seiner to Individual PIC Game” select Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands as Players by total fishing days and by area. “The Taiwan Purse Seiner to PICs Game” and “The Taiwan Purse Seiner to individual PIC Game”, show the Nash equilibrium, the dominant strategy of PICs is “continue implement the VDS” and for Taiwan is “co-management the purse seine fishery”. The Game of Taiwan-Papua New Guinea and Taiwan-Kiribati show the situation of Taiwan purse seine vessel could be well-manage under the scenario of high price of fish. In the case of Taiwan-Marshall Game, Marshall Islands need work opportunities than access fee, therefor co-management is the dominant strategy remarkably for Taiwan when build fishery cooperation with Marshall Islands.
URI: http://ethesys.lib.ntou.edu.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/gsweb.cgi?o=dstdcdr&s=G0010037002.id
http://ntour.ntou.edu.tw:8080/ir/handle/987654321/44158
Appears in Collections:[海洋事務與資源管理研究所] 博碩士論文

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